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Bring up the tunnel and confirm that the IKE authentication was performed by the key inside the CryptoHub.

Initiate the CHILD_SA from the initiator

Shell
The output ends with CHILD_SA net{1} established with SPIs ... and reports initiate completed successfully.

Confirm the security associations on both hosts

Run this on the initiator and then on the responder:
Shell
Each host reports ESTABLISHED, IKEv2 with a child SA marked INSTALLED, TUNNEL. The responder’s local identity is CN=StrongSwan, the identity bound to the CryptoHub-resident key:
The two hosts must mirror each other: the initiator’s local is the responder’s remote, and the SPI values match with the inbound and outbound roles swapped.

Confirm the CryptoHub performed the authentication

On the responder:
Shell
The log shows charon loading the key from the token, then authenticating both identities:
The second line is the proof: charon authenticated itself with a signature it could only have obtained from the CryptoHub, because no private key for CN=StrongSwan exists on the host.

Validate protected traffic

From the initiator, send traffic into the tunnel:
Shell
All packets are answered with no loss.
Then confirm the counters advanced on both hosts:
Shell
The child SA reports non-zero, matching byte and packet counts in each direction, and the counters are mirrored between the two hosts:
Matching counters in both directions confirm the ESP tunnel is carrying the traffic rather than the packets taking an unprotected path. If any check on this page fails, see Troubleshooting.